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On Appeal from the United States District Court 
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O P I N I O N  
   
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellants Dan and Dana Hayden (“the Haydens”) appeal from three orders of the 
District Court: one denying their motion to join an additional defendant; one denying 
their motion to amend their complaint; and one denying their motion to voluntarily 
dismiss their complaint.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.  
I. Background 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only those facts and 
procedural history relevant to our conclusion.   
This matter stems from an insurance dispute following a “hail and windstorm 
event” in Western Pennsylvania.  The storm allegedly caused damage to the Haydens’ 
roof, which allowed water to enter their home and damage the attic and interior 
bedrooms.  At the time of the storm, the Haydens had a homeowner’s insurance policy 
with Appellee Westfield Insurance Company (“Westfield”).  
The storm occurred on March 23, 2011, but the Haydens did not report any 
damage to Westfield until nearly six months later.  Before anyone from Westfield 
inspected their home, the Haydens removed plaster and carpeting from their attic and 
from rooms on the second and third floors of their home.  After a Westfield adjuster 
visited the property, Westfield decided that the Haydens’ claim was better treated as two 
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individual claims: one for the hail damage to the roof and one for the resulting water 
infiltration.  Westfield then issued the Haydens a payment for the hail damage totaling 
$741.63 (after a $1,000 deductible), but continued its investigation of the water 
infiltration claim.       
On March 1, 2012, the Haydens filed suit against Westfield in the Court of 
Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, asserting claims of breach of contract, statutory 
insurance bad faith, and violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and 
Consumer Protection Law (“CPL”).  Westfield removed the action to the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on diversity grounds.   
Ten months later, the Haydens filed a motion to join two additional defendants: 
Lisa Brown and Duncan Insurance Agency, the insurance agent and agency through 
which the Haydens filed their insurance claim.
1
  Soon after, Westfield filed a motion to 
compel discovery from the Haydens.  The District Court ruled on both motions on 
February 13, 2013.  First, it denied the Haydens’ motion for joinder, noting “the 
sparseness of [the Haydens’] Motion and supporting papers, and their complete failure to 
cite to or rely upon any applicable legal authority in support of their Motion.”  App. 32.  
The Court found that denial of joinder was proper for several reasons, including the effect 
of joinder on the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).  
                                              
1
 The Haydens alleged that Ms. Brown, an employee of Duncan Insurance Agency, gave 
false information about the Haydens’ insurance claim to Westfield.  Following joinder, 
the Haydens intended to move to have the case remanded to state court, as joinder would 
have destroyed diversity.     
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Second, the District Court granted Westfield’s motion to compel discovery, although the 
Haydens did not comply before the close of discovery in February 2013.   
As litigation continued, Westfield arranged to have an engineer inspect the 
Haydens’ roof.  The Haydens later alleged that during this process, Westfield hired 
Disaster Restoration Services (“DRS”) to replace a tarp on the Haydens’ roof and DRS 
negligently replaced the tarp with an underlayment, which required an excessive amount 
of nails.  This allegedly caused enough damage to force the Haydens to install a new roof.   
On April 1, 2013, Westfield filed a motion for summary judgment.  The Haydens 
opposed summary judgment on their breach of contract and bad faith claims, but not on 
their CPL claim.  Furthermore, the Haydens did not dispute any of the facts Westfield 
asserted in its Concise Statement of Material Facts, leading the District Court to treat 
those facts as admitted.
2
     
With Westfield’s summary judgment motion pending before the District Court, the 
Haydens filed two motions on May 23, 2013.  First, the Haydens moved to join DRS, a 
Pennsylvania corporation, as an additional defendant (“Motion to Join DRS”).  Second, 
they moved for leave to amend their complaint to add a negligence claim against DRS—
but not Westfield—and to add allegations about the damage DRS allegedly caused to 
                                              
2
 The Haydens failed to comply with Western District of Pennsylvania Local Civil Rule 
56(E), which requires a party opposing summary judgment to file a Responsive Concise 
Statement of Material Facts.  Under that rule, a district court will treat facts that are not 
specifically denied or otherwise controverted in a Responsive Concise Statement as 
admitted.  W.D. Pa. Local Civ. R. 56(E); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). 
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their roof to their breach of contract and bad faith claims against Westfield (“Motion to 
Amend”).     
The District Court denied those motions on July 11, 2013.  The Court held: 
Because the claims to be asserted against such proposed Additional 
Defendant (1) are not otherwise within the jurisdiction of this Court, (2) are 
not part of a common nucleus of operative fact with the original claims, (3) 
the denial of joinder will not prejudice the Plaintiffs’ ability to assert them 
in state court, (4) the Additional Defendant to be joined by amendment has 
not been alleged to have had anything to do with the breach of contract/bad 
faith claims central to the original action, and (5) the Motions come late in 
the process of this case with no imperative reason that they be asserted in 
this civil action, the Motions for Joinder of Additional Defendant and for 
Leave to Amend, are therefore, denied. 
 
App. 4-5.  A month later, with the motion for summary judgment still pending, the 
Haydens filed a new lawsuit against Westfield and DRS in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Allegheny County and then filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss their federal complaint 
(“Motion to Dismiss”).   
 The District Court denied the Haydens’ Motion to Dismiss on October 25, 2013,  
finding that allowing the Haydens to “press the eject button and dismiss their motion at 
this late juncture would markedly prejudice Westfield,” and that the motion “evidence[d] 
a backdoor attempt to shop for . . . a more favorable forum in state court.”  App. 10, 12.  
The District Court also granted Westfield’s motion for summary judgment.3  
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1441.  We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
                                              
3
 The Haydens have not raised any arguments regarding the District Court’s decision to 
grant summary judgment.  Thus, any such arguments on that issue are deemed waived.   
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II. Standard of Review 
We review each of the District Court’s orders for abuse of discretion.  See Hagan 
v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2009); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 
169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009); Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 219 (3d Cir. 2003); In re 
Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. Litig., 916 F.2d 829, 863 (3d Cir. 1990). 
III. Discussion 
a. Reviewability of the July 11 Orders 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether review of the District Court’s 
July 11, 2013 orders denying the Haydens’ Motion to Join DRS and Motion to Amend 
(the “July 11 orders”) is proper.  Westfield contends that the Haydens waived any right to 
review the July 11 orders because the Haydens included only the order issued on October 
25, 2013 (the “October 25 order”), in their Notice of Appeal.  We disagree. 
Although Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c) states that a notice of appeal 
must “designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed from,” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), 
we “liberally construe the requirements of Rule 3(c),”  Pacitti v. Macy’s, 193 F.3d 766, 
777 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Drinkwater v. Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Williams v. Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46, 49-50 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Accordingly, we 
have held review of orders not specified in the notice of appeal is appropriate where: “(1) 
there is a connection between the specified and unspecified order, (2) the intention to 
appeal the unspecified order is apparent, and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and 
has a full opportunity to brief the issues.”  Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 777 (citing Polonski v. 
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Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998); Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 
147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993)). 
Each of these criteria is satisfied here.  First, although Westfield argues that the 
July 11 orders were not connected to the October 25 order, the motions denied in each 
order were the means by which the Haydens sought to achieve the same end: pursuing 
claims against both Westfield and DRS in one forum.  Had the District Court granted the 
Haydens’ Motion to Join DRS and Motion to Amend, it is doubtful the Haydens would 
have filed their Motion to Dismiss.
4
  The District Court recognized this, describing the 
three motions as part of a “daisy chain” of filings stretching back to the Haydens’ first 
failed motion for joinder, all of which had the apparent goal of defeating federal 
jurisdiction.  App. 10 n.2.  Whether or not that was the goal, there is a connection 
between the specified and unspecified orders.  Second, the Haydens’ intent to appeal the 
July 11 orders is apparent from their opening brief.  See Pacitti, 193 F.3d at 777 (finding 
sufficient intent to appeal a discovery order from plaintiffs’ notice of appeal from 
summary judgment order and arguments in plaintiffs’ opening appellate brief); Polonski, 
137 F.3d at 144 (finding that “the appellate proceedings clearly manifest an intent to 
appeal”).  And third, Westfield evidently had a full opportunity to brief the issues and 
does not argue that it was prejudiced.  Therefore, review of the July 11 orders is 
appropriate. 
                                              
4
 This is especially true because, as discussed below, the District Court would have had to 
remand the case to state court if it had joined DRS as a defendant. 
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b. Denial of the Haydens’ Motion to Join DRS 
The Haydens argue that the District Court abused its discretion by denying their 
Motion to Join DRS.  A plaintiff generally may join defendants in an action if the 
plaintiff (1) asserts a right to relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence, and 
(2) “any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A)-(B).  The Haydens contend that Rule 20’s requirements were 
satisfied because Westfield hired DRS to replace the tarp on the Haydens’ roof so 
Westfield’s expert could inspect the roof, making their claims against DRS part of the 
same transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the Haydens’ complaint against 
Westfield.  The District Court, on the other hand, denied joinder because it found the 
matter wholly “distinct and distant from the insurance contract interpretation issues at the 
center of this case.”  App. 4.   
We cannot say the District Court’s denial was an abuse of discretion.  The 
Haydens’ breach of contract and statutory bad faith claims against Westfield arose out of 
Westfield’s refusal to pay the Haydens’ insurance claim as of March 2012.  In contrast, 
the Haydens’ proposed negligence claim against DRS arose out of DRS’s installation of 
an underlayment to their roof nearly a year later in February 2013—a claim they did not 
allege against Westfield.  These claims are notably distinct in both time and subject 
matter.  Thus, the District Court’s denial of joinder under Rule 20 was well within its 
discretion. 
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 Moreover, the District Court properly determined that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over the Haydens’ claims against DRS because adding DRS, a Pennsylvania 
citizen, as a defendant would have destroyed diversity.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  The 
Haydens argue that the District Court could have proceeded under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 
which allows district courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over “all other claims 
that are so related to claims in the action within [the district court’s] original jurisdiction 
that they form part of the same case or controversy.”  28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).  But 
supplemental jurisdiction requires a “common nucleus of operative facts.”  Lyon v. 
Whisman, 45 F.3d 758, 760 (3d Cir. 1995).  In light of the differences in time and subject 
matter between the Haydens’ claims against Westfield and their claims against DRS 
discussed above, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the claims 
lacked a common nucleus of operative facts.
5
            
Because the District Court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the 
Haydens’ claims against DRS, the Court had the option either to deny joinder or to permit 
joinder and remand the action to state court.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e).
6
  While we have 
                                              
5
 Even if the Haydens could satisfy the common nucleus of operative facts requirement, 
the District Court would have lacked jurisdiction over the Haydens’ claims against DRS 
in any event because DRS would have been a party joined under Rule 20, and § 1367(b) 
precludes district courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over “claims by 
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure . . . when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would 
be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.”  28 U.S.C. § 
1367(b); see also 13D Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 
3567.2 (3d ed. 2014). 
6
 Section 1447(e) provides: “If after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional 
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not yet addressed the appropriate analytical approach to § 1447(e) (and need not do so 
here), the Fifth Circuit has instructed that when a district court is “faced with an amended 
pleading naming a new nondiverse defendant in a removed case, [it] should scrutinize 
that amendment more closely than an ordinary amendment,” and should consider “the 
extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal jurisdiction, whether 
[the] plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for amendment, whether [the] plaintiff will be 
significantly injured if amendment is not allowed, and any other factors bearing on the 
equities.”  Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179, 1182 (5th Cir. 1987); see also City 
of Perth Amboy v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 539 F. Supp. 2d 742, 746 (D.N.J. 2008) (noting 
that district courts within the Third Circuit have adopted the Hensgens approach). 
Given these considerations, the District Court’s decision to deny joinder, rather 
than permit joinder and remand the case, was a proper exercise of its discretion.  The 
Haydens’ Motion to Join DRS came well after the close of discovery and the briefing of 
dispositive motions.  In fact, by the time the Haydens moved to join DRS, the Haydens 
had failed to respond to discovery, despite the District Court’s order to compel, and they 
had already attempted to join two entirely different defendants whose joinder also would 
have destroyed federal jurisdiction.  Further, as the District Court noted, the Haydens 
could have “easily and timely” filed suit against DRS in state court.  App. 4.  Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                  
defendants whose joinder would destroy subject matter jurisdiction, the court may deny 
joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(e). 
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District Court’s denial of joinder was not an abuse of discretion under either Rule 20 or § 
1447(e).  
c. Denial of the Haydens’ Motion to Amend 
The Haydens also argue that the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
their Motion to Amend, contending that the District Court “focused almost exclusively on 
why the joinder of an additional defendant was improper, while paying little notice to 
how the Haydens’ new allegations would affect or aid their bad faith case.”  Appellant’s 
Br. 13.  We disagree. 
The District Court denied the Haydens’ Motion to Amend for the reasons set forth 
in its order denying the Motion to Join DRS, which, in turn, referenced the Haydens’ 
delay, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and distinctions between the new allegations 
and the original allegations against Westfield.  Thus, although delay alone would not be a 
sufficient basis to deny a motion to amend, Cureton v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 
252 F.3d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 2001); Cornell & Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978), the record here amply supports the District 
Court’s decision.       
Indeed, as to the proposed allegations against DRS, the record demonstrates that in 
addition to the rationale articulated by the District Court, any amendment would have 
been futile.  Leave to amend may be denied for futility if “the complaint, as amended, 
would fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,” Shane v. Fauver, 213 
F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
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1434 (3d Cir. 1997), or where a federal court would lack subject matter jurisdiction over 
the amended complaint, see Miklavic v. USAir Inc., 21 F.3d 551, 557-58 (3d Cir. 1994).  
Futility is apparent here because DRS had not been joined as a defendant and the District 
Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the Haydens’ proposed claim against DRS. 
Furthermore, as to the proposed allegations against Westfield, the record reflects 
that allowing an amendment at such a late stage would have been prejudicial to 
Westfield.  “A district court may deny leave to amend a complaint if a plaintiff’s delay in 
seeking amendment is undue, motivated by bad faith, or prejudicial to the opposing 
party.”  Cureton, 252 F.3d at 272-73 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).  
Factors to consider include “whether allowing an amendment would result in additional 
discovery, cost, and preparation to defend against new facts or new theories.”  Cureton, 
252 F.3d at 273.   
Here, the new allegations the Haydens sought to raise against Westfield arose out 
of a distinct event—the February 2013 repairs to their roof—and would have subjected 
Westfield to a new wave of discovery despite the Haydens’ failure to comply with the 
District Court’s order to compel.  Moreover, the Haydens filed their Motion to Amend on 
May 23, 2013, after full briefing on Westfield’s motion for summary judgment, so that 
adding new allegations would have required a new round of dispositive motions.  
Whereas Westfield would have been prejudiced by the introduction of new allegations 
after eighteen months of litigation, the Haydens were not prejudiced by the denial of their 
motion, as they could still assert their new claims in a future action, and, indeed, have 
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since done so in state court.  Under these circumstances, denial of the Motion to Amend 
was proper.
7
    
d. Denial of the Haydens’ Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Their Complaint 
Finally, the Haydens argue the District Court abused its discretion by denying 
their Motion to Dismiss.  After a summary judgment motion has been filed, “an action 
may be dismissed at the plaintiff’s request only by court order, on terms that the court 
considers proper,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), and the decision to allow voluntary dismissal 
is left to the sound discretion of the district court, Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 29 (3d 
Cir. 1974); Ockert v. Union Barge Line Corp., 190 F.2d 303, 304 (3d Cir. 1951).  That 
said, “Rule 41 motions should be allowed unless [the] defendant will suffer some 
prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.”  In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B. 
Litig., 916 F.2d at 863 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
                                              
7
 The Haydens argue that “[t]he continuing conduct on the part of the insurer is directly 
relevant to [their] bad faith claim against Westfield,” relying on W.V. Realty, Inc. v. 
Northern Insurance Co., 334 F.3d 306, 314 (3d Cir. 2003) (“W.V. Realty”).  Appellant’s 
Br. 11.  Plaintiffs’ reliance on W.V. Realty is misplaced.  W.V. Realty recognized certain 
circumstances where courts have permitted bad faith claims to survive motions to dismiss 
based on conduct that occurred after the insured filed suit, including where insurers made 
misrepresentations to the court, filed baseless or abusive motions, or engaged in other 
conduct “beyond a discovery violation[] suggesting that the conduct was intended to 
evade the insurer’s obligations under the insurance contract.”  334 F.3d at 314.  Neither 
the Haydens’ Motion to Amend nor their proposed Second Amended Complaint alleged 
sufficient facts to illustrate how Westfield’s conduct in hiring DRS to replace the tarp on 
the Haydens’ roof constituted continuing bad faith.  Rather, the Haydens simply alleged 
that DRS was negligent in replacing the tarp and that Westfield was responsible.  In any 
event, this argument does not change our holding that denial of amendment was 
appropriate because of prejudice to Westfield.   
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We conclude, however, that there was sufficient prejudice to warrant denial of 
dismissal here.  Chief among the factors to consider in determining whether a defendant 
will suffer prejudice are the extent to which litigation has progressed and the extent to 
which the defendant will be exposed to new litigation in another forum.  See Ferguson, 
492 F.2d at 28-29; Ockert, 190 F.2d at 304 (noting that voluntary dismissal is “an 
increasingly burdensome matter to one’s opponent” after an answer is filed and case 
preparation progresses). 
Our decision in Ferguson is instructive.  There, we determined that the district 
court abused its discretion in permitting the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal because of the 
prejudice to the defendants who were “ordered to defend anew” in state court “[f]ourteen 
months after they became defendants in one case . . . and at least two months after they 
had expected that all discovery had been completed.”  Ferguson, 492 F.2d at 29.  
Recognizing that the plaintiffs were primarily motivated by a desire to combine the 
action with a suit against a different defendant in state court (one whose joinder in the 
federal action would have destroyed diversity), we held that their desire to “kill two birds 
with one stone” was not a compelling reason to dismiss at such a late date, and we 
“express[ed] extreme doubt that these circumstances would have been persuasive” even if 
the motion to dismiss had been presented prior to the close of discovery.  Id. at 29 & n.8.   
Those same considerations apply with even more force here. The Haydens’ 
Motion to Dismiss came seventeen months after the start of litigation and six months 
after the close of discovery, and as the District Court noted, it is apparent that their 
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primary, if not only, reason for dismissal was to litigate against both Westfield and DRS 
in state court, i.e., to “kill two birds with one stone.”  The Haydens contend that 
Westfield will suffer little prejudice because it can use the same arguments, depositions, 
testimony, and documents in state court as it did in federal court, but Westfield’s ability 
to recycle its federal court litigation materials is little consolation, particularly when 
Westfield evidently never received much of the discovery it sought from the Haydens, 
even after its successful motion to compel.  Under these circumstances, the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Haydens’ Motion to Dismiss. 
IV. Conclusion 
The District Court acted well within its discretion when it denied the Haydens’ 
Motion to Join DRS, Motion to Amend, and Motion to Dismiss.  We therefore affirm.
